IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tut/cremwp/201518.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Délégation stratégique dans un duopole mixte international

Author

Listed:
  • Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara

    (ESCA école de Management - CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, University of Caen Normandie, France)

Abstract

La littérature sur les incitations managériales met en évidence que l'utilisation des contrats incitatifs pour les gestionnaires permet d'augmenter le bien-être social. Ce papier considère l'impact des schémas de rémunération managériaux dans un duopole où une firme semi-publique est en concurrence avec une firme privée étrangère. Nous supposons que le contrat incitatif offert aux gestionnaires de la firme semi-publique tient compte d'une partie des objectifs sociaux de l'autorité publique. Contrairement au cas où la firme semi-publique est en concurrence avec une firme domestique, nous montrons Qu'il existe un équilibre où la firme semi-publique n'a pas intérêt à inciter son gestionnaire. De plus, dans le duopole international, l'introduction de ces contrats incitatifs managériaux peut être néfaste pour le bien-être social.

Suggested Citation

  • Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara, 2015. "Délégation stratégique dans un duopole mixte international," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201518, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201518
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversions/d6974460-2702-44df-bdd4-747cb958a1ad
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ziss, Steffen, 2001. "Horizontal mergers and delegation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 471-492, March.
    2. Juan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz, 2009. "The Decision To Hire Managers In Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 376-388, September.
    3. Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:27:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    6. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
    7. Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel & Lopez-Cunat, Javier, 2001. "Delegation and mergers in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1263-1279, September.
    8. Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, 2010. "Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 744-750.
    9. White, Mark D., 2001. "Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 877-896, November.
    10. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Tomohiro Inoue, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(27), pages 1-7.
    11. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Tomohiro Inoue, 2009. "Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 325-333.
    12. Sylvain Ouattara Kadohognon, 2013. "Incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte : cas de la privatisation partielle de la firme publique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(4), pages 495-517.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kadohognon S Ouattara, 2016. "How privatization affects the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the case of international mixed duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1038-1045.
    2. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2019. "Combining the Endogenous Choice of the Timing of Setting the Levels of Strategic Contracts and Their Contents in a Managerial Mixed Duopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 235-261, June.
    3. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2019. "Endogenous Choice of the Timing of Setting Incentive Parameters and the Strategic Contracts in a Managerial Mixed Duopoly with a Welfare-Based Delegation Contract and a Sales Delegation Contract," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 679-737, December.
    4. John S. Heywood & Zerong Wang & Guangliang Ye, 2022. "Strategic delegation in an international mixed oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1888-1898, September.
    5. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2020. "Endogenously choosing the timing of setting strategic contracts’ levels and content in a managerial mixed duopoly with welfare-based and sales delegation contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 67(3), pages 363-402, September.
    6. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2011. "Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives in an international oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-61, March.
    7. Corrado Benassi & Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo, 2021. "Efficiency of bilateral delegation in a mixed Cournot duopoly," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 493-508, July.
    8. Rupayan Pal, 2010. "Cooperative Managerial Delegation, R&D And Collusion," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 155-169, April.
    9. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2019. "Combining the endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the contents of strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 207-233.
    10. Rupayan Pal, 2012. "Delegation And Emission Tax In A Differentiated Oligopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80(6), pages 650-670, December.
    11. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2014. "Strategic delegation in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(3), pages 275-296, November.
    12. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2009. "Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 90-99.
    13. Yoshihiro Tomaru & Yasuhiko Nakamura & Masayuki Saito, 2009. "Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly with Managerial Delegation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1904-1924.
    14. Trishita Bhattacharjee & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-009, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    15. Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, 2010. "Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 744-750.
    16. Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo & Marcella Scrimitore, 2014. "Organizational Structure and the Choice of Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 521-542, December.
    17. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2009. "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 71-82.
    18. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2017. "Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(2), pages 189-209, August.
    19. Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo & Marcella Scrimitore, 2013. "Organizational Structure and the Choice of Price vs. Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly," Working Paper series 27_13, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    20. Kadohognon sylvain Ouattara & Ahmed haidara Ould abdessalam, 2019. "The decision to hire managers in the presence of public and CSR firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2517-2526.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Duopole mixte; incitations managériales; privatisation partielle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: GERMAIN Lucie (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crmrefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.