Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms
AbstractBy considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semipublic firm) and that all the firms are equally efficient, then in equilibrium both firms hire managers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Mixed duopoly; Semipublic Firms; Managerial incentive contracts; Cournot competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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- Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz, 2009. "The Decision To Hire Managers In Mixed Markets Under Bertrand Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 376-388.
- Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
- White, Mark D., 2001. "Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 877-896, November.
- Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
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