Cooperative Attitudes in Nonprofit Firms. Evidence from An Artefactual Field Experiment with Workers of Social Cooperatives
AbstractWe investigate strategic choices of individuals working for social cooperatives in Italy. Specifically, a 2-players Prisoner’s Dilemma is administered as an attachment to a nationwide survey of nonprofit organizations. We experimentally manipulate social proximity of the participants and efficiency of cooperation. We show that higher efficiency of cooperation has a significant positive impact on the cooperation rate in the game, while closer social proximity does not significantly affect choices. In addition, a positive correlation between perceived organizational fairness and self–reported intrinsic motivation is identified in the sample under investigation. This finding provides stimulating insights on the interplay between organizational features and workers’ motivational factors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 1101.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Cooperation; Field Experiments; Social Dilemmas; Nonprofit Organizations;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-11 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-06-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-11 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2011-06-11 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SOC-2011-06-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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