Bidding for Contracts under Uncertain Demand: Skewed Bidding and Risk Sharing
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More about this item
Keywords
Contract; Unit-Price; Fixed-Price; Portfolio; Cost Overrun; Procurement; Scoring Auction;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGR-2022-09-26 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-COM-2022-09-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2022-09-26 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2022-09-26 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2022-09-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2022-09-26 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
- NEP-RMG-2022-09-26 (Risk Management)
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