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The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

Author

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  • Andreas Eisl

    (Centre d'études européennes et de politique comparée)

Abstract

Au cours des dernières années, tous les pays membres de la zone euro ont introduit des règles budgétaires nationales qui fixent des limites à la dette et aux déficits publics. Les règles budgétaires réduisent le pouvoir discrétionnaire des responsables politiques en matière budgétaire et affectent leur capacité à utiliser les budgets publics pour le pilotage macroéconomique et pour la redistribution. Alors que ces contraintes institutionnelles vont à l’encontre des préférences traditionnelles des partis sociaux-démocrates, on peut s’étonner de constater que ces derniers ont soutenu les réformes des règles budgétaires pendant la crise de la dette en Europe. Cette étude défend l’idée selon laquelle les règles sur le déficit structurel, un concept central des initiatives de réforme au sein de la zone euro, ont abouti à un consensus ambigu entre les partis du centre-droit et ceux du centre-gauche. Tandis que les partis conservateurs et libéraux soutiennent généralement les contraintes sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire des institutions, les règles sur le déficit structurel – contrairement aux règles sur le déficit nominal – ont permis aux partis sociaux-démocrates et à d’autres partis de gauche de les relier à leurs préférences pour des politiques keynésiennes contra-cycliques plus larges et au maintien des impôts sur les revenus tout au long du cycle économique, afin d’assurer la capacité redistributive de l’État. Sur la base d’études de cas portant sur trois pays (Allemagne, Autriche et France), cet article montre comment le concept de règles sur le déficit structurel a facilité – du moins au niveau discursif – le soutien des contraintes institutionnelles par les partis sociaux-démocrates et par d’autres partis de gauche. Sur le plan théorique, la présente étude développe la recherche sur le rôle de l’ambiguïté dans la prise de décisions politiques, en (re)conceptualisant trois formes d’ambiguïté sous-jacentes au consensus ambigu : l’ambiguïté textuelle, l’ambiguïté institutionnelle et l’ambiguïté conceptuelle.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Eisl, 2020. "The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone," Sciences Po publications 20/4, Sciences Po.
    • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/jpcu0knbl80rpibin9slrlrlb
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    References listed on IDEAS

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