Crime, Immigration and the Labor Market: A General Equilibrium Model
AbstractDoes immigration cause crime? To answer this question, we build a two-country general equilibrium model with search costs in which the migration (in/out-)flows, the crime rates and the equilibrium wages in the two countries are determined by the interaction between the labor market, the crime market and the decision to migrate. The main result of our model is that, in equilibrium, the relationship between immigration and crime depends on the conditions of both the labor and crime markets of the two countries. In particular, when the tightness of the labor market is sufficiently elastic relative to that of the crime market, immigration causes a reduction in the domestic crime rate of the host country. An implication of this result is that migration flows from countries with strong work rigidities to societies characterized by more elastic labor markets are mutually benefic in terms of reducing the corresponding crime rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series ISLA Working Papers with number 38.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.isla.unibocconi.it/
Crime Rate; Labor Market; Immigration.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2010-11-27 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2010-11-27 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2010-11-27 (Economics of Human Migration)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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