Taxation and marriage: Evidence from a natural experiment in France
AbstractThis paper uses the French family quotient reform of 1995 to analyze the impact of the individual income tax on marriage behavior. An important feature of this reform was the cancelation of fiscal subsidies aimed at cohabiting couples with children. Before 1995, the system of the family quotient granted one extra half unit to each single parent with children as defined for tax purposes. The 1995 family quotient reform cancels the benefit for cohabitants with children by introducing the notion of isolated parents with children in the tax declaration. This measure thus compensates the marriage penalty for couples with children but does not change anything for couples without children. To assess the impact of the reform, we use the difference-in-differences estimation approach. Using the panel structure of the French employment survey during the 1990’s we find high and heterogeneous effect of the reform on the probability of marriage. In particular, the probability of marriage has increased by about 5 points for young cohabitant couples with children, and by about 12 to 14 points when focusing on those with more than one kid or on those with less educated woman and higher educated man.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 08-01.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Marriage; Income Taxation; Labor Supply; Natural Experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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