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The Impact of Switching Costs on Vendor Financing

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Author Info
Martin Boyer () (CEFA, HEC-Montreal)
Karine Gobert () (GREDI, Faculte d'administration, Université de Sherbrooke)

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Abstract

Empirical studies point to trade credit as an important continuing source of short term financing for small and medium-sized enterprises. We show that vendor financing appears in equilibrium as the result of repeated trade interactions between a buyer and a supplier when changing supplier is costly. The supplier is then able to extract a periodic rent from the buyer. The presence of switching costs is not, however, detrimental to the buyer because competition between suppliers for this rent forces them to offer a rebate before the relationship is initiated. This sequence of a rebate followed by high prices is similar to a long term financing structure. The role of switching costs is similar to that of a precommitment device that allows the buyer to borrow a limited amount of capital from the supplier in the first period and to roll over the debt until the end of the relationship. In the case of small business owners who have difficulty accessing financial markets, our model suggests that switching costs allows them to smooth their dividend income, albeit inefficiently, by using vendor financing.

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File URL: http://pages.usherbrooke.ca/gredi/wpapers/GREDI-0718.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 07-18.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:shr:wpaper:07-18

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Related research
Keywords: Trade credit; financing of the firm; commitment; self-enforcing contracts.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  1. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2001. "Firms as financial intermediaries - evidence from trade credit data," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2696, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Giuseppe Marotta, 2003. "When do trade credit discounts matter? Evidence from Italian firm-level data," Heterogeneity and monetary policy 0303, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D. Wolken, 1993. "The demand for trade credit: an investigation of motives for trade credit use by small businesses," Staff Studies 165, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, Ren? M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(04), pages 391-405, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Chee K. Ng & Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, 1999. "Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Terms Used in Interfirm Trade," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1109-1129, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1994. "What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," NBER Working Papers 4875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Smith, Janet Kiholm, 1987. " Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 863-72, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Brennan, Michael J & Maksimovic, Vojislav & Zechner, Josef, 1988. " Vendor Financing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1127-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1997. "Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 661-91.
    Other versions:
  13. Marcel Boyer & M. Martin Boyer & René Garcia, 2005. "The Value of Real and Financial Risk Management," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-38, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  14. John R. Graham & Clifford W. Smith, 1999. "Tax Incentives to Hedge," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2241-2262, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Campbell, Tim S. & Kracaw, William A., 1987. "Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 315-328, September. [Downloadable!]
  16. John R. Graham & Daniel A. Rogers, 2002. "Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(2), pages 815-839, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Jyrki Niskanen & Mervi Niskanen, 2006. "The Determinants of Corporate Trade Credit Policies in a Bank-dominated Financial Environment: the Case of Finnish Small Firms," European Financial Management, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, vol. 12(1), pages 81-102. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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