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Leadership and Corruption in Russia, 2000-2004

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  • Alena Ledeneva

    (UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies)

Abstract

The paper defines the key features of corruption and perception of corruption in Russia under Putin. It provides a comparison of trends of corruption perception index in the CIS region and CEE countries and focuses on specifics of President Putin’s policies in application. The analysis questions the assumptions about informal practices and formal institutions and offers interpretations of the dependence of Putin’s regime on the ‘unwritten rules’.

Suggested Citation

  • Alena Ledeneva, 2005. "Leadership and Corruption in Russia, 2000-2004," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 54, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
  • Handle: RePEc:see:wpaper:54
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    File URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17515/1/17515.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    2. Andrew Goudie & David Stasavage, 1997. "Corruption: The Issues," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 122, OECD Publishing.
    3. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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