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The Development of Insolvency Procedures in Transition Economies: a Comparative Analysis

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  • Ewa Balcerowicz
  • Iraj Hashi
  • Jens Lowitzsch
  • Miklos Szanyi

Abstract

In the past ten years all transition economies have adopted modern bankruptcy legislation as part of their institution building efforts. But their approach to insolvency and their determination to use the insolvency process as a selection mechanism have varied widely. The aim of the paper is two fold. Firstly, we identify the role of insolvency procedures in TEs, particularly in the orderly handling of financial distress and restructuring. Secondly, we analyse the recent developments in insolvency legislation in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, emphasising their inherent features and their impact on the restructuring process.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewa Balcerowicz & Iraj Hashi & Jens Lowitzsch & Miklos Szanyi, 2003. "The Development of Insolvency Procedures in Transition Economies: a Comparative Analysis," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0254, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0254
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    File URL: https://case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/1718103_254.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Franks, Julian R & Torous, Walter N, 1992. "Lessons from a Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Insolvency Codes," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 70-82, Autumn.
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    5. Franks, Julian R. & Torous, Walter N., 1994. "A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 349-370, June.
    6. Ewa Balcerowicz & Andrzej Bratkowski, 2001. "Restructuring and Development of the Banking Sector in Poland. Lessons to be Learnt by Less Advanced Transition Countries," CASE Network Reports 0044, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lupu Dan, 2013. "The Insolvency Phenomenon And The Non Performing Loans," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 2, pages 345-349, April.
    2. Régis BLAZY & Nicolae STEF, 2015. "How do bankruptcy systems perform in Eastern Europe?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2015-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    3. Régis Blazy & Nicolae Stef, 2020. "Bankruptcy procedures in the post-transition economies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 7-64, August.
    4. Onofrei, Mihaela & Lupu, Dan, 2014. "The modelling of forecasting the bankruptcy in Romania," MPRA Paper 95511, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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