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Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Russia: The Case of Blue Chips of the Stock Market

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  • Kuznetsov, Pavel
  • Muravyev, Alexander

Abstract

Based on panel data from 1995 – 1997, the paper focuses on the impact of ownership structure on the performance of Russian non-financial privatized companies that constitute the group of "blue chips" of the country's stock market. We find that ownership concentration results in higher technical efficiency of enterprises, but benefits from productivity improvements do not adequately materialize in higher profitability and market value of companies. This is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis that large owners use their power to extract private benefits of control. We also find that the association between ownership by different groups of owners and firm performance is relatively weak and subject to reversed causality. There is evidence that ownership by Russian non-state shareholders negatively affects firm value suggesting that this group of owners is inclined to the extraction of private benefits of control.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27231.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27231

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Keywords: Russia; corporate governance; ownership structure.;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan : Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," Governance Working Papers 22830, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  2. Salla Pöyry & Benjamin Maury, 2010. "Influential ownership and capital structure," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(5), pages 311-324.
  3. Muravyev, Alexander & Talavera, Oleksandr & Bilyk, Olga & Grechaniuk, Bogdana, 2009. "Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine," IZA Discussion Papers 4372, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Nadia Vanteeva, 2012. "The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia," Transition Studies Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 23-34, September.
  5. Vitaliy Zheka, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Ukraine," CERT Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University 0605, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  6. Sprenger, Carsten, 2011. "The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 260-277, June.
  7. Muravyev, Alexander, 2003. "Государственные Пакеты Акций В Российских Компаниях: Происхождение, Типы И Влияние На Результаты Деятельности
    [Government-owned blocks of shares in Russian companies]
    ," MPRA Paper 27393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.
  9. Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia & Muravyev, Alexander, 2011. "CEO and Board Characteristics as Determinants of Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange," IZA Discussion Papers 6256, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Kashif Rashid & Seep Nadeem, 2014. "The Role of Ownership Concentration, its Types and Firm Performance: A Quantitative Study of Financial Sector in Pakistan," Oeconomics of Knowledge, Saphira Publishing House, Saphira Publishing House, vol. 6(2), pages 10-61, June.

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