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Private ownership and corporate performance : some lessons from transition economies

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Author Info
Frydman, Roman
Gray, Cheryl W.
Hessel, Marek
Rapaczynski, Andrzej
Abstract

Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the authors compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition. They find strong evidence that private ownership--except for worker ownership-- dramatically improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the"privatization shock"that was supposed to afflict the behavior of firms undergoing rapid changes in ownership. Instead, they observe a severe shock from marketization, affecting both state and privatized firms--but a shock for which private ownership provides a powerful antidote. Among their other findings are : a) Private ownership is most effective in improving a firm's ability to generate revenues, an area in which entrepreneurship seems to be required. Ownership also affects a firm's ability to remove the rather obvious cost inefficiencies inherited from the past, but this effect is less pronounced, as both state and privatized firms engage in significant cost restructuring. b) Privatized firms generate significantly more employment gains than state firms. It is their superior ability to generate revenues, rather than competence at cost-cutting, that allows them to sustain or expand employment. This is why privatization is the dominant strategy for expanding employment in transition. c) Outsider-owned firms perform better than insider-owned firms on most performance measures, but there is enough difference between employee- and manager-owned firms to suggest that putting all insiders under a common umbrella is unjustified. Although the effects of managerial ownership are ambiguous, putting employees in control appears to offer no advantages over state ownership on any measure and creates a distinct disadvantage in terms of employment performance. d) Among outsider owners, privatization funds seem to do as well at revitalizing the privatized companies as do other outsider owners; in particular, the authors find no evidence that funds are less effective than'strategic'investors. And foreign investors provide perhaps less of an edge than might have been expected; their impact appears no stronger than that of major domestic outsiders.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1830.

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Date of creation: 30 Sep 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1830

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Keywords: Small and Medium Size Enterprises; Small Scale Enterprise; Microfinance; Banks&Banking Reform; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Microfinance; Private Participation in Infrastructure; Small Scale Enterprise; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Pohl, Gerhard, 1997. "Ownership and corporate governance : evidence from the Czech Republic," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1737, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1997. "Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 73, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  4. Djankov, Simeon & Pohl, Gerhard, 1997. "The restructuring of large firms in Slovakia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1758, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Brian Pinto & Marek Belka & Stefan Krajewski, 1993. "Transforming State Enterprises in Poland: Evidence on Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1993-1), pages 213-270. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pinto, Brian & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1994. "Ownership and corporate control in Poland : why state firms defied the odds," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1308, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wang, Hua & Jin, Yanhong, 2002. "Ownership And Industrial Pollution Control: Evidence From China," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19671, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Cull, Robert & Matesova, Jana & Shirley, Mary, 2001. "Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2568, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Muravyev, Alexander & Bilyk, Olga & Grechaniuk, Bogdana, 2009. "Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine," MPRA Paper 13685, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kouznetsov Pavel & Muravyev Alexander, 2001. "Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Russia: The Case of Blue Chips of the Stock Market," EERC Working Paper Series 01-10e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  5. Köke, Jens F., 1999. "Institutional investment in Central and Eastern Europe : investment criteria of Western portfolio managers," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-37, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marc Duponcel, 1998. "Restructuring of food industries in the five Central and Eastern European front-runners towards EU membership (CEEC-5). A comparative review," CERT Discussion Papers 9806, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Restructuring of insider-dominated firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2046, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Irina Akimova & Gerhard Schwödiauer, 1999. "Restructuring of Ukrainian Enterprises after Privatization: Does Ownership Structure Matter?," Industrial Organization 9903003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yurii Perevalov, Ilya Gimadii, Vladimir Dobrodei, 2000. "Does Privatisation Improve Performance of Industrial Enterprises? Empirical Evidence from Russia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 337-363, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alan Bevan & Saul Estrin & Mark E. Schaffer, 1999. "Determinants of Enterprise Performance during Transition," CERT Discussion Papers 9903, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lawrence Peter King, 1999. "The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: The Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 277, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  12. Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2047, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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