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Moving-Horizon Control in Dynamic Games

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  • W. A. van den Broek

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    (Tilburg University)

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    Abstract

    We consider a continuous-time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving-horizon control. The well-known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two concepts for solutions fitting into the moving-horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail among the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of the moving-horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt stabilization model.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 with number 122.

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    Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf9:122

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    Postal: CEF99, Boston College, Department of Economics, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
    Fax: +1-617-552-2308
    Web page: http://fmwww.bc.edu/CEF99/
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    1. Bovenberg, A.L. & Aarle , B. van & Raith, M., 1995. "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-153069, Tilburg University.
    2. Engwerda, J.C., 1998. "On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80026, Tilburg University.
    3. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December.
    4. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
    5. Feenstra, T.L., 1998. "Environmental Policy Instruments and International Rivalry: A Dynamic Analysis," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-76006, Tilburg University.
    6. Ploeg, F. van der & Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1991. "A differential game of international pollution control," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377518, Tilburg University.
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