The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in Argentina
AbstractIn 1989, Argentina entered a process of sweeping transformation of its economic institutions which provided for the (temporary) recovery of economic growth and the taming of inflation. The Argentine experience with market-oriented reforms has been regarded by the literature as a salient case of radical and 'unconstrained' reform. Yet, a closer scrutiny portrays that the building and maintenance of a pro-"reform coalition determined the pace, depth and characteristics of the 'new economic institutions'. The idiosyncrasies of Argentina's political institutions, in turn, conditioned this coalition-building strategy. The same idiosyncrasies were at play in the 2001/2002 collapse of the convertibility regime and ensuing social and political chaos.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia in its series Working Papers with number 43.
Date of creation: Mar 2002
Date of revision: Mar 2002
Publication status: Published in Policy Reform, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, pages 75-88
political economy; policy; reform; Argentina;
Other versions of this item:
- Juliana Bambaci & Tamara Saront & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in Argentina," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 75-88.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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