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Credit rationing and credit view: empirical evidence from loan data

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Abstract

The empirical literature tries to identify credit rationing and its determinants by using balance sheet data or evidence from corporate surveys. Observational equivalence, identification problems, and interview biases are serious problems in these studies. We analyse the determinants of credit rationing directly on credit files by looking at the difference between the amount demanded and supplied to each borrower from official bank records. Our findings provide microeconomic evidence in support of the credit view hypothesis showing that the European Central Bank refinancing rate is significantly and positively related to partial (but not total) credit rationing. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that such variable affects the total volume of commercial bank loans.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 144.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 30 Sep 2009
Date of revision: 30 Sep 2009
Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:144

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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
Phone: +390672595601
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Web page: http://www.ceistorvergata.it
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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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Web: http://www.ceistorvergata.it

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Keywords: credit rationing; credit view; loan data.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Simon Cornée & Ariane Szafarz, 2013. "Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market," Post-Print halshs-00874615, HAL.
  2. Simon Cornée, 2012. "The Relevance of Soft Information for Predicting Small Business Credit Default: Evidence from a Social Bank," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201226, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  3. Amélie Artis & Simon Cornée, 2013. "Transformation informationnelle, certification et intermédiation financière : le cas de la banque solidaire," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201326, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  4. Leonardo Becchetti & Melody Garcia, 2008. "Do collateral theories work in social banking ?," CEIS Research Paper 131, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Nov 2008.

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