Two-Sided Uncertainty In The Monopoly Agenda Setter Model
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 215.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1990
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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
uncertainty ; monopolies ; information;
Other versions of this item:
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1993. "Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 429-444, March.
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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"Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance,"
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"Private Demands for Public Capital: Evidence from School Bond Referenda,"
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- Balsdon, Ed & Brunner, Eric J. & Rueben, Kim, 2003. "Private demands for public capital: evidence from school bond referenda," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 610-638, November.
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