IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rio/texdis/439.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

ITR sem mentiras: um comentário sobre a taxação de terras com informação assimétrica

Author

Listed:
  • Juliano Junqueira Assunção

    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

  • Humberto Moreira

    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

Abstract

O objetivo do artigo é mostrar que a assimetria de informação presente na relação entre governo e produtores agropecuários pode constituir a origem dos problemas que ainda persistem na aplicação do Imposto Territorial no Brasil. Atra-vés da construção de um modelo teórico simples, que se baseia no problema de taxação ótima sob informação assimétrica, é possível analisar limitações inerentes à aplicação do Imposto Territorial Rural que ainda não se incorporaram à análise da taxação de terras. Diante de uma situação onde há terra ociosa, como ocorre no Brasil, o modelo teórico desenvolvido mostra que o uso do ITR como único instrumento tributário não é capaz de implementar o esquema ótimo. E a solução apontada pelo modelo envolve a utilização de um esquema misto que considera o Imposto sobre a Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS) e o ITR. Dessa forma, o modelo apresentado tenta preencher uma lacuna existen-te entre os modelos de taxação sob informação assimétrica e os modelos mais es-pecíficos de taxação de terra. E, como implicações de política, os resultados suge-rem um redirecionamento do estudo do ITR, atualmente centrado em questões de ordem operacional, como determinação de alíquotas e outras regras.

Suggested Citation

  • Juliano Junqueira Assunção & Humberto Moreira, 2000. "ITR sem mentiras: um comentário sobre a taxação de terras com informação assimétrica," Textos para discussão 439, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  • Handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:439
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td439.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carter, Michael R. & Mesbah, Dina, 1993. "Can land market reform mitigate the exclusionary aspects of rapid agro-export growth?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 1085-1100, July.
    2. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1979. "Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 471-500.
    3. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    4. Skinner, Jonathan, 1991. "If Agricultural Land Taxation Is So Efficient, Why Is It So Rarely Used?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 5(1), pages 113-133, January.
    5. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    6. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. World Bank, 2003. "Brazil : Inequality and Economic Development, Volume 1. Policy Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 14653, The World Bank Group.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Assunção, Juliano Junqueira & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2004. "Land taxes in a Latin American context," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 526, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    2. World Bank, 2003. "Brazil : Inequality and Economic Development, Volume 2. Background Papers," World Bank Publications - Reports 14696, The World Bank Group.
    3. Gregor Schwerhoff & Ottmar Edenhofer & Marc Fleurbaey, 2020. "Taxation Of Economic Rents," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 398-423, April.
    4. Rasul, Imran & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2010. "The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 781-788, March.
    5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
    6. Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    7. Ruiz del Portal, X., 2009. "A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 262-278, March.
    8. Cl'emence Alasseur & Corinne Chaton & Emma Hubert, 2020. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods: efficiency of in-kind insurance," Papers 2001.02099, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    9. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars A., 2022. "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    10. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2016. "Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 18-31.
    11. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    12. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    13. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax or other adverse selection models with random participation," THEMA Working Papers 2012-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    14. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "In Praise of Frank Ramsey's Contribution to the Theory of Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0(583), pages 235-268, March.
    15. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    17. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2018. "Pareto efficient taxation and expenditures: Pre- and re-distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 101-119.
    18. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2004. "The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2227-2258, September.
    19. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
    20. Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2014. "The choice of the number of varieties: Justifying simple mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 7-21.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:439. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dpucrbr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.