Optimal Manipulation Rules in a Mixed Duopoly
AbstractWe study the optimal manipulation rules of a public ﬁrm’s objective function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in which they are aﬀected by the degree of product substitutability. This allows us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other speciﬁc government’s commitments on the objective function of the public management can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the objective function and Stackelberg leadership.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 43_11.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Mixed oligopoly; strategic manipulation; partial privatization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-10-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-10-09 (Industrial Organization)
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