Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Cournot-Bertrand Profit Differential in a Differentiated Duopoly with Unions and Labour Decreasing Returns

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luciano Fanti

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pisa, Italy)

  • Nicola Meccheri

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pisa, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy)

Abstract

This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly (with imperfect substitutes), total wage bill maximizing unions and labour decreasing returns. It is shown that the standard result, that equilibrium profits are always higher under Cournot, may be reversed even for a fairly low degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the presence of labour decreasing returns tends to reinforce the mechanisms that contribute to the reversal result, making this event possible for a wider range of situations, with respect to those identified by the earlier literature.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp36_10.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 36_10.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:36_10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Patara, 3, 47921 Rimini (RN)
Phone: +390541434142
Fax: +39054155431
Email:
Web page: http://www.rcfea.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Cournot-Bertrand profit differential; unions; labour decreasing returns;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lopez, Monica Correa & Naylor, Robin A., 2004. "The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 681-696, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2012. "Differentiated Duopoly and Horizontal Merger Profitability under Monopoly Central Union and Convex Costs," Working Paper Series 05_12, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  2. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "When an efficient bargaining is more “efficient” than a competitive labour market," Discussion Papers 2011/131, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  3. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "The dynamics of a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products and bounded rational firms revisited," Discussion Papers 2011/120, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  4. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "Stability in a Cournot duopoly under asymmetric unionism," Discussion Papers 2011/123, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  5. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2011. "Efficient bargaining versus right to manage: a stability analysis with heterogeneous players in a duopoly with quantity competition and trade unions," MPRA Paper 34434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "The dynamics of a differentiated duopoly with quantity competition," Discussion Papers 2011/121, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  7. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2011. "The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: a stability analysis," MPRA Paper 34144, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2012. "Profits and competition in a unionized duopoly model with product differentiation and labour decreasing returns," Discussion Papers 2012/133, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  9. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2012. "Labour decreasing returns, industry-wide union and Cournot-Bertrand profit ranking. A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 894-904.
  10. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "When do firms prefer either monopolistic unions or an efficient bargaining?," Discussion Papers 2011/130, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  11. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Welfare effects of cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly," Discussion Papers 2011/125, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  12. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: when profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Discussion Papers 2011/128, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:36_10

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roberto Patuelli).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.