Optimal bonuses and deferred pay for bank employees: implications of hidden actions with persistent effects in time
AbstractWe present a sequence of two-period models of incentive-based compensation in order to understand how the properties of optimal compensation structures vary with changes in the model environment. Each model corresponds to a different occupation within a bank, such as credit line managers, loan originators, or traders. All models share a common trait: the effects of hidden actions are persistent, and hence are revealed over time. We characterize the corresponding optimal contracts that are consistent with prudent risk taking. We compare the contracts by ranking them according to the average wage, the proportion of deferred compensation, and the structure and importance of variable pay (bonuses). We also compare these characteristics of the models with persistence with those of a standard repeated moral hazard. We find that small changes in the structure of asymmetric information have important implications for the characteristics of optimal pay, and that persistence does not necessarily imply a higher proportion of deferred pay.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 1230.
Date of creation: 2011
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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- Arantxa Jarque & Edward S. Prescott, 2010. "Optimal bonuses and deferred pay for bank employees : implications of hidden actions with persistent effects in time," Working Paper 10-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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- Borys Grochulski, 2011. "Financial firm resolution policy as a time-consistency problem," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 133-152.
- repec:fip:fedreq:y:2011:i:2q:p:133-152:n:vol.97no.2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Arantxa Jarque & Edward S. Prescott, 2013. "Banker compensation and bank risk taking: the organizational economics view," Working Paper 13-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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