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The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management

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Author Info
J.B. Donaldson
J.P. Danthine

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Abstract

We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and control. We propose an alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the firm’s hiring and investment decisions. Under imperfect monitoring and incomplete contracting, delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. This conflict fundamentally results from the different income base of both types of agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions are taken into account. We derive the dynamic consequences of this divergence in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution and discuss the likelihood that appropriate incentive contracts offered the manager will mitigate the consequences of this divergence

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File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/jdanthine/working%20papers/delegated%20mgt.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 289.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:289

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Related research
Keywords: business cycles; delegated management; contracting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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  1. Gary Gorton & Ping He, 2006. "Agency-Based Asset Pricing," NBER Working Papers 12084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bianca De Paoli, Alasdair Scott, Olaf Weeken, 2007. "Asset pricing implications for a New Keynesian model," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 156, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Rui Albuquerque & Neng Wang, 2007. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing," NBER Working Papers 13251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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