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Who `Wins' in Wage Bargaining

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  • Daniel Hamermesh

Abstract

Tests the "split the difference" bargaining model by examining data on the parties' opening and final positions with respect to wages in various negotiations concluded between September 1968 and December 1970. Difficulty with the model proposed by John Nash; Possibilities that emerged. (Abstract copyright EBSCO.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 398.

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Date of creation: Mar 1971
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:398

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References

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  1. Robert S. Smith & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 1981. "Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs: Some Data Problems," NBER Working Papers 0827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Gruber, Jonathan, 1994. "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 622-41, June.
  3. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying For Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition And Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466, May.
  4. Dranove, David & Spier, Kathryn E. & Baker, Laurence, 2000. "'Competition' among employers offering health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 121-140, January.
  5. Madrian, Brigitte C, 1994. "Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There Evidence of Job-Lock?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(1), pages 27-54, February.
  6. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1, pages 2.
  7. Anne Beeson Royalty & Neil Solomon, 1999. "Health Plan Choice: Price Elasticities in a Managed Competition Setting," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-41.
  8. Patricia M. Danzon, 1990. "Mandated Employment-Based Health Insurance:Incidence and Efficiency Effects," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 60, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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Cited by:
  1. Fuess, Jr., Scott M., 2001. "Union Bargaining Power: A View from Japan," IZA Discussion Papers 393, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: the Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," Cahiers de recherche 0619, CIRPEE.
  3. Echenique, Federico & Chambers, Christopher P., 0. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

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