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Escalating games: how intermediate levels of conflict affect stability of cooperation

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  • Dubovik, Andrei
  • Parakhonyak, Alexei

Abstract

We argue that cooperation can become more fragile if (i) there are sufficiently many intermediate levels of cooperation and (ii) players cannot respond with large punishments to small deviations. Such disproportional punishments can be perceived as unreasonable or players can face external constraints---political checks, negative publicity, etc. Specifically, we show that regardless of how patient the players are, any prisoner's dilemma game can be extended with intermediate levels of cooperation in such a way that full conflict is the only equilibrium outcome of the extended game.

Suggested Citation

  • Dubovik, Andrei & Parakhonyak, Alexei, 2018. "Escalating games: how intermediate levels of conflict affect stability of cooperation," MPRA Paper 89783, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:89783
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89783/1/MPRA_paper_89783.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry, 1994. "An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 83-96, January.
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    4. Friedman, James W. & Samuelson, Larry, 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 304-324, December.
    5. Theodore To, 1988. "More Realism in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 402-408, June.
    6. Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 923-942, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflict escalation; intermediate levels of conflict; repeated games; prisoners dilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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