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Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan

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Author Info
Shah, Syed Akhter Hussain
Khalid, Mahmood
Shah, Tariq

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Abstract

The future of devolution plan in Pakistan may be analysed in view of our Convergence model. This model views stability of the local Govt. system drawn on Devolution Plan 2001. It claims that as there would be more volatile and non-committed (floating) number of agents in the political market and governance system, there is more probability of divergence; i.e. the system will remain unstable. Contrary to that more is the systematic trend in political market and governance system more is the probability that the convergence in the system occurs and that in turn leads to stability of the over all system. In this ‘Convergence’ Model different types of agents have been highlighted on the basis of their political ffiliation and being in competition as ruling elite and/or their allies and non-ruling elite and/or their allies. The agents have interactive relationship horizontally and vertically with other agents i.e. either they are ally or otherwise. The composition of this structure of the agents and clients is based on the principle of bottom top pproach i.e. Union council’s members, Nazim and their political competitors, Tehsil council and Nazim, District Nazim and his allied district assembly members and their political competitors, Member provincial Assembly and their political rivals, Member National Assembly/Senator, and their political rival and the ruling political elites, Provincial Government and their political rivals, and Political elites ruling Federal Government and their political rivals.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8690.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published in The Pakistan Development Review 4.45(2006): pp. 855-871
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8690

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H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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  1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
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