A "double coincidence" search model of money
AbstractAccording to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 7839.
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Money; Search; Double Coincidence; Bargaining;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-03-25 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2008-03-25 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2008-03-25 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2008-03-25 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, .
"Money and the Gains from Trade,"
IEW - Working Papers
100, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Peter Rupert & Martin Schindler & Andrei Shevchenko & Randall Wright, 2000. "The search-theoretic approach to monetary economics: a primer," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q IV, pages 10-28.
- Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Randall Wright, 1989.
"A contribution to the pure theory of money,"
123, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:5:y:2008:i:2:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shouyong Shi, 2006. "Viewpoint: A microfoundation of monetary economics," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 643-688, August.
- Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2002. "Matching and Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 67-71, May.
- Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2003. "Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 731-756, 05.
- Engineer, Merwan & Shouying Shi, 1998. "Asymmetry, imperfectly transferable utility, and the role of fiat money in improving terms of trade," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 153-183, February.
- Nicola Amendola, 2008. "A selection mechanism for the barter equilibrium in the search theoretic monetary model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(2), pages 1-10.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.