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Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités
[Modern optimal governance of universities]

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  • Jellal, Mohamed

Abstract

This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State and the university. The State, through taxation is responsible for funding education. We show that presence of asymmetric information between the state and a representative university generates a sub-optimal allocation. Indeed, the situation of private information on all relevant variables naturally creates a situation of rent for university. Therefore, given the cost of public funds and in order to reduce the rent of public universities the state is led to create strategic distortion that actually lead to limit the rent, which results in terms of allocation to a second-best solution associated to a decline in performance of university.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 57275.

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Date of creation: 10 Jul 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57275

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Keywords: Higher Education; Universities; Regulation; Governance; Information ; Contract theory;

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  1. Ehrenberg, R.G.Ronald G., 2004. "Econometric studies of higher education," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(1-2), pages 19-37.
  2. DEL REY, Elena, . "Teaching versus research: a model of state university competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1501, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. George Psacharopoulos, 2004. "Public versus private University Systems," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(4), pages 39-43, 01.
  4. Gautier, Axel & Wauthy, Xavier, 2007. "Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 273-295, February.
  5. Becker, William E, Jr, 1979. "Professorial Behavior Given a Stochastic Reward Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 1010-17, December.
  6. De Fraja, Gianni & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2002. "Competition among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 275-93, July.
  7. John Beath & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & David Ulph, 2005. "University Funding Systems and their Impact on Research and Teaching: A General Framework," Discussion Paper Series 2005_2, Department of Economics, Loughborough University.
  8. Graves, Philip E & Marchand, James R & Thompson, Randal, 1982. "Economics Departmental Rankings: Research Incentives, Constraints, and Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1131-41, December.
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