IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/56722.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Small Firms Hypothesis and the Percent of U.S. Society without Health Insurance: An Investigation Using Alternative Means Tests

Author

Listed:
  • Cebula, Richard
  • Bopp, Anthony

Abstract

The objective of this study is to proffer and then empirically investigate for the U.S. what is being identified as the “small firms hypothesis,” i.e., a hypothesis that the greater the percentage of firms that are “small,” the greater the percentage of the population that will be without health insurance. This is based on the premises that smaller firms face bargaining-power, financial, and competitive constraints that tend to limit their ability to provide group health insurance benefits to their employees, with the result being that employees at smaller firms are relatively more likely than employees at larger firms to be without a health insurance fringe benefit. The empirical analysis in the study adopts the percentage of private firms with 20 or fewer employees as the measure of “small firms.” A second objective of this study is to ascertain whether the strength (robustness) of the findings on behalf of the small firms hypothesis is sensitive to alternative measure(s) of family purchasing power or family economic status. Accordingly, eight different estimations are undertaken, each one adopting a different specification for measuring family economic status. The cross-section analysis provides strong empirical support for the “small firms hypothesis” across all of the specifications for family economic status.

Suggested Citation

  • Cebula, Richard & Bopp, Anthony, 2007. "The Small Firms Hypothesis and the Percent of U.S. Society without Health Insurance: An Investigation Using Alternative Means Tests," MPRA Paper 56722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56722
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56722/1/MPRA_paper_56722.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David M. Cutler, 1994. "A Guide to Health Care Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 13-29, Summer.
    2. Jonathan Gruber, 2003. "Evaluating Alternative Approaches to Incremental Health-Insurance Expansion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 271-276, May.
    3. Richard Cebula, 2006. "A Further Analysis of Determinants of Health Insurance Coverage," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 12(3), pages 382-389, August.
    4. Nathan J. Ashby, 2007. "Economic Freedom and Migration Flows between U.S. States," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(3), pages 677-697, January.
    5. John Holahan & Len M. Nichols & Linda J. Blumberg & Yu-Chu Shen, 2003. "A New Approach to Risk-Spreading via Coverage-Expansion Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 277-282, May.
    6. Irena Dushi & Marjorie Honig, 2003. "Price and Spouse's Coverage in Employee Demand for Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 252-256, May.
    7. Office of Health Economics, 2007. "The Economics of Health Care," For School 001490, Office of Health Economics.
    8. repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:382-389 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2007. "Predictability and predictiveness in health care spending," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-48, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richard J. Cebula, 2008. "Small Firm Size and Health Insurance: A Private Enterprise Perspective," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 24(Fall 2008), pages 51-77.
    2. Cebula, Richard, 2010. "Effects of Health Insurance and Medical Care Inflation on Voluntary Enlistment in the Army: An Empirical Study in the United States," MPRA Paper 51246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:382-389 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alexander, Gigi & Cebula, Richard & Saadatmand, Yassamand, 2005. "Determinants of the Percent of the Population Enrolled in HMOs," MPRA Paper 51268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Richard Cebula, 2006. "A Further Analysis of Determinants of Health Insurance Coverage," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 12(3), pages 382-389, August.
    6. Cebula, Richard & Nair-Reichert, Usha & Taylor, Kyle, 2009. "Does a Lack of Health Insurance Elicit an Increase in the Rate of Voluntary Military Enlistment in the U.S.? The "Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis," 1974-2007," MPRA Paper 56719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Michele Fioretti & Hongming Wang, 2020. "Performance Pay in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Medicare," Working Papers 2020.03, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
    8. Timothy J. Layton & Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2015. "Assessing Incentives for Adverse Selection in Health Plan Payment Systems," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-024, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    9. Bundorf M. Kate & Herring Bradley & Pauly Mark V., 2010. "Health Risk, Income, and Employment-Based Health Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-35, September.
    10. Glazer Jacob & Huskamp Haiden A. & McGuire Thomas G., 2012. "A Prescription for Drug Formulary Evaluation: An Application of Price Indexes," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-26, March.
    11. Geruso, Michael & McGuire, Thomas G., 2016. "Tradeoffs in the design of health plan payment systems: Fit, power and balance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-19.
    12. John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2008. "The Effect of Medicare Coverage for the Disabled on the Market for Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. McGuire, Thomas G. & Newhouse, Joseph P. & Normand, Sharon-Lise & Shi, Julie & Zuvekas, Samuel, 2014. "Assessing incentives for service-level selection in private health insurance exchanges," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 47-63.
    14. Normann Lorenz, 2013. "Adverse selection and risk adjustment under imperfect competition," Research Papers in Economics 2013-05, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    15. Richard Cebula & Anthony Bopp, 2008. "Estimating the Percentage of the US Population without Health Insurance: An Ecological Approach," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 14(3), pages 336-347, August.
    16. Penno, Erin & Sullivan, Trudy & Barson, Dave & Gauld, Robin, 2021. "Private choices, public costs: Evaluating cost-shifting between private and public health sectors in New Zealand," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 406-414.
    17. Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle & Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter C Smith, 2011. "Does Better Disease Management in Primary Care Reduce Hospital Costs?," Working Papers 065cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    18. Sungchul Park & Anirban Basu & Norma Coe & Fahad Khalil, 2017. "Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment," NBER Working Papers 24038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Randall P. Ellis & Ching‐to Albert Ma, 2011. "Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 27-44, January.
    20. Mark Shepard, 2016. "Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange," NBER Working Papers 22600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Timothy Layton & Ellen J. Montz & Mark Shepard, 2017. "Health Plan Payment in U.S. Marketplaces: Regulated Competition with a Weak Mandate," NBER Working Papers 23444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    health insurance; bargaining power; small firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56722. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.