I currency board come strumento di stabilizzazione economica: come funzionano e dove sono adottati
[Currency boards as instrument for economic stabilisation: how they work and where they are adopted]
AbstractThis paper describes the functioning of a currency board within the socio-economic context in which it operates. Special focus is given to the macroeconomic implications of a currency board system compared to a central bank system. In particular the author describes the principles regulating a currency board system (par.3), analyses the most relevant experiences on the adoption of a currency board (par. 5) and its advantages and problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4966.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Currency Boards; Monetary Policy; Central Banks;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P24 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - National Income, Product, and Expenditure; Money; Inflation
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
- O23 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
- P52 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
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