Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Game theory model for European government bonds market stabilization: a saving-State proposal

Contents:

Author Info

  • Carfì, David
  • Musolino, Francesco

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present a proposal regarding the possible stabilization of the rapid variations on the value of government bonds issued by the States, using the ``Game Theory". In particular, we focus our attention on three players: a large bank that has immediate access to the market of government bonds (hereinafter called Speculator, our first player), the European Central Bank (ECB, the second player) and the State in economic difficulty (our third player). We propose on financial transactions the introduction of a tax (cashed directly by the State in economic difficulty), which hits only the speculative profits. We show that the above tax would probably be able to avert the speculation, and, even in case of speculation on its government bonds, the State manages to pull itself out of the crisis. Finally, we also propose a cooperative solution that enables all economic actors involved (the Speculator, the ECB and the State) to obtain a profit.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39742/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39742.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39742

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Game theory; Government bonds; European Central Bank; Spread; Tax; Speculation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management," MPRA Paper 37098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. David Carfi & Francesco Musolino, 2011. "Fair Redistribution In Financial Markets: A Game Theory Complete Analysis," Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(2), pages 74-100, December.
  3. Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2011. "Game complete analysis for financial markets stabilization," MPRA Paper 34901, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Musolino, Francesco & Carfì, David, 2012. "A game theory model for currency markets stabilization," MPRA Paper 39240, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39742. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.