A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets by adopting Game Theory, in particular, the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game and the new mathematical model of Coopetitive Game, proposed recently in the literature by D. Carfì. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract. We propose hereunder two kinds of agreement: a fair transferable utility agreement on the an initial natural interaction and a same type of compromise on a quite extended coopetitive context.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37098.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Financial Markets and Institutions; Financing Policy; Financial Risk; Financial Crises; Game Theory; Arbitrages; Coopetition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-03-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-RMG-2012-03-14 (Risk Management)
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- Musolino, Francesco & Carfì, David, 2012. "A game theory model for currency markets stabilization," MPRA Paper 39240, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "Game theory model for European government bonds market stabilization: a saving-State proposal," MPRA Paper 39742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012.
"The government-taxpayer game,"
38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David CARFI & Caterina FICI, 2012. "The Government-Taxpayer Game," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 13-25, June.
- Carfí, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2014. "Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets with financial transaction taxes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 306-319.
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