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Game complete analysis of symmetric Cournot duopoly

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  • Carfì, David
  • Perrone, Emanuele

Abstract

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9], and already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) to the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing the same commodity and selling it in the same market. In this classic model, in a competitive background, the two enterprises employ, as possible strategies, the quantities of the commodity produced. The main solutions proposed in literature for this kind of duopoly are the Nash equilibrium and the Collusive Optimum, without any subsequent critical exam about these two kinds of solutions. The absence of any critical quantitative analysis is due to the relevant lack of knowledge regarding the set of all possible outcomes of this strategic interaction. On the contrary, by considering the Cournot Duopoly as a differentiable game (a game with differentiable payoff functions) and studying it by the new topological methodologies introduced by D. Carfì, we obtain an exhaustive and complete vision of the entire payoff space of the Cournot game (this also in asymmetric cases with the help of computers) and this total view allows us to analyze critically the classic solutions and to find other ways of action to select Pareto strategies. In order to illustrate the application of this topological methodology to the considered infinite game, several compromise decisions are considered, and we show how the complete study gives a real extremely extended comprehension of the classic model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35930.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35930

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Related research

Keywords: duopoly; normal-form games; microeconomic Policy; complete study of differentiable games; bargaining solutions;

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Cited by:
  1. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2012. "A model of coopetitive game for the environmental sustainability of a global green economy," MPRA Paper 38508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. David CARFI & Caterina FICI, 2012. "The Government-Taxpayer Game," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 13-25, June.
  3. David Carf\`i & Daniele Schilir\`o, 2012. "Global Green Economy and Environmental Sustainability: a Coopetitive Model," Papers 1205.2872, arXiv.org.
  4. Carfì, David & Bagileri, Daniela & Dagnino, Gianbattista, 2012. "Asymmetric R&D alliances and coopetitive games," MPRA Paper 37095, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Daniela Baglieri & David Carf\`i & Giovanni Battista Dagnino, 2012. "Asymmetric R&D Alliances and Coopetitive Games," Papers 1205.2878, arXiv.org.

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