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Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets

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  • Hervés-Estévez, Javier
  • Moreno-García, Emma

Abstract

We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different equivalence results. In addi- tion, several counterexamples state boundaries for the possibility of extending and generalizing our results.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39385.

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Date of creation: 10 Jun 2012
Date of revision: 10 Jun 2012
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39385

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Keywords: Bargaining sets; coalitions; core; veto mechanism;

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  1. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garci­a, Emma, 2008. "Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 697-706, July.
  2. Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1994. "Nonatomic Economies and the Boundaries of Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 593-633, May.
  3. Herves-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garcia, Emma & Nunez-Sanz, Carmelo & Rui Pascoa, Mario, 2000. "Blocking Efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 72-86, July.
  4. Vind, Karl, 1992. "Two characterizations of bargaining sets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 89-97.
  5. Schjodt, Ulla & Sloth, Birgitte, 1994. "Bargaining Sets with Small Coalitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 49-55.
  6. Grodal, Birgit, 1972. "A Second Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 581-83, May.
  7. Marialaura Pesce, 2010. "On mixed markets with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 23-53, October.
  8. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-86, May.
  9. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-80, May.
  10. Evren, Özgür & Hüsseinov, Farhad, 2008. "Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1180-1196, December.
  11. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
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