Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets
AbstractWe analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different equivalence results. In addi- tion, several counterexamples state boundaries for the possibility of extending and generalizing our results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39385.
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2012
Date of revision: 10 Jun 2012
Bargaining sets; coalitions; core; veto mechanism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-25 (Microeconomics)
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