The ideas behind the bargaining set (Aumann & Maschler, and Mas-Colell) as a solution concept are formalized. An alternative to the Mas-Colell bargaining set is defined and characterized.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
90-08.
Length: 13 pages Date of creation: May 1990 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992, 21(1) pp 89-97 Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9008
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory