Two characterizations of bargaining sets
AbstractThe ideas behind the bargaining set (Aumann & Maschler, and Mas-Colell) as a solution concept are formalized. An alternative to the Mas-Colell bargaining set is defined and characterized.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
- Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma, 2012. "Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets," MPRA Paper 39385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2012.
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