Old lady charm: a comment
AbstractI start from Nicola Giocoli’s acute rational reconstruction of current US antitrust debate which shows that there really is no shortage of plausible explanations to the Chicago persistent appeal puzzle. Each explanation, taken in isolation, is, at best, only partial. In my view, the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust owes much to the enduring grip of the equilibrium end-state notion of competition within top US Economics Departments and to the (alleged) resilience of market competition, absent entry/exit barriers, in the face of Type II Errors committed by antitrust Agencies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39211.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Chicago school of law and economics; Type I and Type II Errors; entry barriers and horizontal merger regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-06-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HPE-2012-06-13 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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