[The Effects of Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Shareholders' Rights on Corporate Governance: Empirical Analysis Based on China's Listed Retail Firms]
AbstractThis paper, using the total factor productivity in the Cobb-Douglas production function, empirically investigates into the effects of market competition, managerial incentives and shareholders' rights on corporate governance under the framework of pooled OLS and fixed effects regression method. In this paper, I find that (1) there exists a complementary relation between shareholders' rights and managerial incentives in terms of corporate governance and (2) the effect of shareholders' rights on corporate governance is dependent on market competition. The more intense the market competition, the less shareholders' rights contribute to better governance, and vice versa. These findings provide some new views to the study of corporate governance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38598.
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision: May 2012
market competition; managerial incentives; shareholders' rights; corporate governance; total factor productivity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
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