The Effect of Salvage Market on Strategic Technology Choice and Capacity Investment Decision of Firm under Demand Uncertainty
AbstractThis paper examines the effect of salvage market on strategic technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage firms choose their production technology between two alternatives: modular production process (flexible technology) or unified production process (inflexible technology). Then at the second stage they decide on the amount of capacity investment: flexible firm makes decision about general and specific components’ capacity and inflexible firm just about unified component (final product). One stage forward both enter the primary market in which demand is uncertain and play a duopoly Cournot game on the amount of quantity they manufacture and finally at the last stage, flexible firm will be able to sell its unsold general components in the secondary market (salvage market) with a deterministic price. Solving optimization problems of the model results in intractable equations which lead us to employ numerical studies considering a specific probability distribution to observe equilibrium behavior of competing firms. Broad range of parameters with respect to established relationships among them have been examined in order to cover all the possible economically reasonable scenarios. Findings are expressed explicitly in the form of observations where we demonstrate that with symmetric parameterization there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both firms choose inflexible technology while applying asymmetric parameters has the potential to form two types of equilibrium when 1. Both firms choose inflexible technology or 2. Only one firm chooses flexible technology. Moreover it is shown that there is a specific unified cost threshold that could shift the equilibrium of the game. Finally we discuss on the case that there is no equilibrium and mention some managerial implications of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37836.
Date of creation: 20 Mar 2012
Date of revision: 03 Apr 2012
Salvage Market; Modular and Unified Production Process; Product Postponement; Demand Uncertainty; Investment Decision; Operation Management;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-04-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-04-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2012-04-17 (Economics of Strategic Management)
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