Unemployment, tax evasion and the "slippery slope" framework
AbstractThe proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance (both voluntary and enforced), tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm's decision to evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities, and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on voluntary and enforced compliance. The main result is that with the “right mix” of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, (voluntary) tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37433.
Date of creation: 18 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
tax evasion; tax compliance; trust and power; unemployment;
Other versions of this item:
- Gaetano Lisi, 2012. "Unemployment, tax evasion and the slippery slope framework," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 297-302, September.
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-IUE-2012-03-28 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-03-28 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Petrongolo, Barbara & Pissarides, Christopher, 2000.
"Looking Into The Black Box: A Survey Of The Matching Function,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2409, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
- Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," CEP Discussion Papers dp0470, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2010. "Tax Compliance by Trust and Power of Authorities," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 607-610.
- Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, January.
- Sandmo, Agnar, 2005. "The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 58(4), pages 643-63, December .
- Gaetano Lisi, 2012.
"Macroeconomic implications of the dynamics between power and trust: a theoretical formalisation of the ‘slippery slope’ framework,"
Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour
1012, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Gaetano Lisi, 2012. "Macroeconomic implications of the dynamics between power and trust: a theoretical formalisation of the ‘slippery slope’ framework," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2012_21, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Gaetano Lisi, 2013. "Tax Morale, Tax Compliance and the Optimal Tax Policy," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0313, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
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