Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly
AbstractWe investigate the equilibrium market sturcture in virtual platform duopoly (auctions or other market forms) that are prevalent in internet settings. We take full account of the complexity of network effects in such markets and determine optimal pricing strategies. We invstigate the welfare implications of such strategies, look at the impact of non-exclusive services and at what happens in large markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3239.
Date of creation: 21 Dec 2005
Date of revision: 15 Apr 2007
Two-sided Markets; Duopoly Pricing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-05-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-05-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-05-19 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2007-05-19 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2004.
3043414, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000092, David K. Levine.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-28, Summer.
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