Endogenous R&D and Intellectual Property Laws in Developed and Emerging Economies
AbstractThe incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed, both for an emerging economy as well as for a developed economy. The optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of laws abroad. Moreover, a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under other circumstances. These results depend upon the curvature of the R&D production function. Finally, we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy and find conditions under which there is an improvement in both patent length as well as patent breadth in the emerging economy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31822.
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Patent Length; Patent Breadth; Productivity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EFF-2011-07-02 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-INO-2011-07-02 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-07-02 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2011-07-02 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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