Wake up economists! - Currency-issuing central governments have no budget constraint
AbstractAbstract: Despite what mainstream economists preach, currency-issuing central governments have no budget constraint. It is therefore incumbent upon them to use their unique spending and taxing powers to achieve the broader goal of sustainable development. Their failure to do so has meant that nations have fallen well short of realising their full potential. Rather than accept the neo-liberal myth that ‘small government is best’, the citizens of a nation should welcome the central-government’s responsible use of their unique spending and taxing powers to provide sufficient public goods and critical infrastructure, achieve and maintain full employment, resolve critical social and environmental concerns, and meet the requirements of an aging population. Should central governments fail in their responsibility to prudently use their unique powers, public disapproval is best registered through the ballot box, not through degenerative debates that distort the facts about the operation of a modern, fiat-currency economy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28224.
Date of creation: 05 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Keywords: Central governments; government budgets; fiscal and monetary policy; sustainable development;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- B50 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-01-30 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2011-01-30 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2011-01-30 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-01-30 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2011-01-30 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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