Partial privatization and environmental policies
AbstractThe paper compares emission tax and emission quota in a mixed duopoly when the partial privatization of a public firm is allowed. Furthermore, we consider the following two cases with regard to the objective of the public firm: (1) the public firm maximizes the weighted average of its profit and wefare and (2) the public firm maximizes the weighted average of its profit and the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. We show that emission tax is welfare superior to emission quota regardless of the degree of partial privatization in (1), whereas the former is inferior to the latter when the degree of partial privatization is high in (2).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27630.
Date of creation: 21 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
environment; mixed duopoly; quota; tax;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2011-01-03 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENE-2011-01-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-01-03 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leonard F. S. Wang & Ya-chin Wang & Lihong Zhao, 2009. "Privatization and the Environment in a Mixed Duopoly with Pollution Abatement," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3112-3119.
- Shuichi Ohori, 2006. "Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 225-233, 03.
- Kazuhiko Kato, 2006. "Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(3), pages 263-283, 09.
- Kazuhiko Kato, 2013. "Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(2), pages 165-180, October.
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