Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth
AbstractWe develop two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in time preferences. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. In the second model, natural resources are commonly owned and the resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. We show that if discount factors are given exogenously, the long-run rate of growth under private property is higher than or equal to that under common property. If the discount factors are formed endogenously, under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private property.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27524.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
natural resources; economic growth; voting; private property; common property;
Other versions of this item:
- Kirill Borissov & Alexander Surkov, 2010. "Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth," EUSP Deparment of Economics Working Paper Series Ec-02/10, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics, revised 29 Sep 2010.
- Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2011-01-03 (Environmental Economics)
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