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Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth

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  • Kirill Borissov
  • Alexander Surkov

Abstract

We develop two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in time preferences. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. In the second model, natural resources are commonly owned and the resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. We show that if discount factors are given exogenously, the long-run rate of growth under private property is higher than or equal to that under common property. If the discount factors are formed endogenously, under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private property.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics in its series EUSP Deparment of Economics Working Paper Series with number Ec-02/10.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 18 Aug 2010
Date of revision: 29 Sep 2010
Handle: RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec0210

Note: Presented at the Monte Verita Conference on Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics — SURED 2010 (Ascona, Switzerland, June 7-10, 2010), the 2010 World Conference on Natural Resource Modeling (Helsinki, Finland, June 16-19, 2010) and the 11th Annual Conference of the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET10, Istanbul, Turkey, June 25-27, 2010).
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Keywords: economic growth; taxation; voting;

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  1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Discussion Papers 07-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Heltberg, Rasmus, 2002. " Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 189-214, April.
  3. Becker, Robert A, 1980. "On the Long-Run Steady State in a Simple Dynamic Model of Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Households," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(2), pages 375-82, September.
  4. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
  5. Antonio Rangel, 2003. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 813-834, June.
  6. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
  7. Kirill Borissov & Stéphane Lambrecht, 2009. "Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 93-112, April.
  8. Chermak, Janie M. & Patrick, Robert H., 2002. "Comparing tests of the theory of exhaustible resources," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 301-325, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Susan Randolph & Patrick Guyer, 2011. "Tracking the Historical Evolution of States' Compliance with their Economics and Social Rights Obligations of Result: Insights from the Historical SERF Index," Economic Rights Working Papers 18, University of Connecticut, Human Rights Institute.

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