Explaining the two-way causality between inequality and democratization through corruption and concentration of power
AbstractCorruption increases inequality in the society (Gupta et al, 1998) by reducing economic growth, biasing the tax system, reducing the amount and the efficiency of spending on key areas for human capital formation. Mohtadi and Roe (2002) and Mohtadi and Agarwhal (2002) argue that democracy first increases corruption due to the newly introduced freedom and rights, and then as democracy grows corruption decreases. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between inequality and democracy in two directions, both the effect of democracy on inequality and the effect of inequality on democracy. It will help to establish a more direct link than explaining inequality indirectly through corruption. It follows from the existing literature on democratization and inequality that higher level of inequality brings decrease in democratization, since inequality increases the incentives of the elite class to limit the democractic rights of the rest of the population in order to avoid any uprisings. (Acemoglu, 2001) The causality may be thought to run from the other direction, too; that is, from the effect of democracy on inequality: Democracy first increases, then decreases corruption (Mohtadi and Roe, 2002) So, at the beginning, the increased corruption due to democratization would be expected to increase inequality (Gupta et al, 1998).Then at the later stages democracy lowers the inequality since it lowers corruption, rent seeking agents would be high in number and the average rent would decrease.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26415.
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
inequality; corruption; democratization; growth; institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1998. "New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-287.
- Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003.
"Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
- Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2001. "Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending And Growth," Bulletins, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center 12981, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.