An Empirical Study of Corruption in Ports
AbstractWe generate an original dataset on bribe payments at two competing ports in Southern Africa that allows us to take an unusually close look at the relationship between bureaucratic organization, bribe-setting behavior and the costs corruption imposes on users of public services. We find that the way bureaucracies are organized can generate different opportunities for bureaucrats to engage in "collusive" or "coercive" types of corruption. We then observe how firms adjust their shipping and sourcing strategies in response to different types of corruption. "Collusive" corruption is cost-reducing for firms, increasing usage of the corrupt port, while "coercive" corruption is cost-increasing, reducing demand for port services. Our findings therefore suggest that firms respond to the opportunities and challenges created by different types of corruption, organizing production in a way that increases or decreases demand for the public service.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 21791.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Corruption; Transport; Trade Costs; Firm Behavior;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2010-04-11 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-04-11 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-POL-2010-04-11 (Positive Political Economics)
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