Comunicación indirecta en situaciones de soborno y amenaza
[Indirect communication in bribery and threatening situations]
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery and threats are rational preference mechanisms, whose functions can be expressed in non-linear diagrams. This analysis also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis for strategic action in various forms of conflict, from war to irregular traffic jams caused by vehicular traffic. Our particular interest in the bribery and the threat is related to common cases in the colombian conflict.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20070.
Date of creation: 09 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Strategy of Conflict; indirect communication; negotiation; bribery; threats; indirect speech acts.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fernando, Estrada, 2007.
"La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto
[The information and rumor in zones of conflict]," MPRA Paper 20344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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