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Simulating the enforcement policies for irregular sector in the Italian labour reform

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  • Bonaventura, Luigi

Abstract

In this paper an agent-based model (abm) will be used to study the effects of enforcement policy in Italy: d.lgs. 124/2004. Three kinds of policy will be tested in the model: control, sanction and legitimacy-regulation. The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punishment; the third is measured by the social legitimacy of regulation. This simulation has produced a number of results, the most important of which are: the negligible influence of control increasing to enforce irregularity; the strong influence of the level of punishment on the irregularity ratio in all Italian areas; the good political choice to increase the social legitimacy to regulation in promoting regularity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonaventura, Luigi, 2006. "Simulating the enforcement policies for irregular sector in the Italian labour reform," MPRA Paper 1731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1731
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    enforcement policies; irregular sector; agent-based model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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