Simulating the enforcement policies for irregular sector in the Italian labour reform
AbstractIn this paper an agent-based model (abm) will be used to study the effects of enforcement policy in Italy: d.lgs. 124/2004. Three kinds of policy will be tested in the model: control, sanction and legitimacy-regulation. The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punishment; the third is measured by the social legitimacy of regulation. This simulation has produced a number of results, the most important of which are: the negligible influence of control increasing to enforce irregularity; the strong influence of the level of punishment on the irregularity ratio in all Italian areas; the good political choice to increase the social legitimacy to regulation in promoting regularity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1731.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
enforcement policies; irregular sector; agent-based model;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2007-02-17 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-02-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-02-17 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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