A pseudo-endowment effect in internet auctions
AbstractAlthough bidders in an internet auction do not obtain the actual ownership of the item during the auction, they still act according to an endowment eﬀect. In a unique data set of 17,000 Danish furniture auctions I ﬁnd that having the leading bid, both in terms of time and dollars, will aﬀect the bidders probability to rebid if outbid. Thus, expectations to own, i.e. “pseudo-endowment ”, seem to aﬀect bidders’ willingness to pay in a relative fast and straightforward manor. Gener- ally, these data therefore support that the reference point, from which we measure losses and gains, is closely related to expectations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14813.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Internet auctions; Reference-Dependent Preferences; Endowment Eﬀect; bidding behavior; eBay; WTP; Reference Point;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John List, 2003.
"Does market experience eliminate market anomalies?,"
Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website
00297, The Field Experiments Website.
- John A. List, 2003. "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71, February.
- Matthew Rabin, 2006.
"A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press,
MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1133-1165, November.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Method and Hist of Econ Thought, EconWPA 0407001, EconWPA.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics 784828000000000341, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Koszegi, Botond & Rabin, Matthew, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt0w82b6nm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Bid early and get it cheap - Timing effects in Internet auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 14811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ulrike Malmendier & Young Han Lee, 2011.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 749-87, April.
- Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007. "The Bidder's Curse," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 14815, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.