The model of the linear city under a triangular distribution of consumers: an empirical analysis on price and location of beverage kiosks in Catania
AbstractThis paper presents a model of oligopolistic competition under horizontal differentiation of products and a triangular distribution of consumers. The triangular distribution aims to represent a case of concentration of consumers around the central location. The main result is that a good deal of differentiation among products is achieved also under such assumption concerning the consumers’ distribution. This means that the incentive to differentiate – to some extent - prevails on the incentive to the central location, although consumers are concentrated in the central location. The analysis on an original empirical case-study is presented, concerning the choice of beverage retails in a town. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12694.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Product differentiation; Hotelling; Empirical analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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